Munitions and Readiness Strain: The Iran conflict has consumed more than two years of combined Tomahawk production, directly threatening Japan's strike capability timeline and US operational readiness. Tokyo's long-range strike program is a cornerstone of its deterrence posture against China and North Korea. Delay pushes back the window in which Japan can credibly threaten PLA rear areas, reducing the deterrent value of the capability during the period of highest Taiwan risk (2028-2031). Vermilion assesses that if munitions shortfalls persist, Japan will accelerate indigenous cruise missile production under the Type 12 program and seek alternative suppliers, potentially including European partners. The removal of Gen. Randy George mid-term, with no public explanation, signals a degree of instability at the top of the Army. While frequent senior leader turnover during active operations is common during wartime (Civil War, WWII, etc), it has little correlation with either strategic success or failure.

Allied Hedging and Acceleration: South Korea's decisions to accelerate the Low-Altitude Missile Defense (LAMD) program by two years and procure SM-3 interceptors via foreign military sales (FMS) indicate Seoul is not waiting for US reassurance. The LAMD system is designed to counter North Korean long-range artillery threatening Seoul, a threat that could materialize faster than US reinforcement timelines allow. The SM-3 purchase extends South Korean Aegis destroyers into the ballistic missile defense (BMD) mission, reducing dependence on US BMD assets that may be diverted elsewhere. Seoul's elevation of ties with France to 'Global Strategic Partner' status, with explicit cooperation on Strait of Hormuz shipping security, is a hedge against US bandwidth constraints. France maintains a permanent naval presence in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. For South Korea, which imports the vast majority of its energy via sea, diversifying maritime security partnerships reduces single-point-of-failure risk tied to US commitments but does not solve capacity problems.

The first-ever South Korean Air Force refueling activity on Japanese territory is a small but significant milestone. It demonstrates operational-level interoperability between two nations with historically difficult relations. Vermilion assesses that the Iran crisis is accelerating Japan-ROK defense cooperation faster than would occur under normal diplomatic timelines.

Trade Decoupling and Taiwan's Centrality: Taiwan's 81.8% export surge to the US underscores its irreplaceable position in the AI supply chain. Taiwanese firms control roughly 90% of global AI server production and 70% of advanced semiconductor foundry capacity. The tariff regime has paradoxically strengthened Taiwan's economic leverage with Washington while accelerating US-China decoupling. China's ability to sustain export growth despite 100%+ bilateral tariffs should be questioned at the data level, but still demonstrates the limits of tariff-based coercion. Transshipment through ASEAN allows Beijing to evade direct penalties while flooding third-party markets. This validates concerns that tariffs alone cannot contain Chinese economic influence without complementary enforcement on origin-of-goods rules.

South China Sea Expansion: China's resumption of island-building after a near-decade pause signals renewed confidence or urgency. New bases extend PLA reach, complicate allied operational planning, and create fait accompli positions that are costly to reverse. The timing, amid US distraction in the Middle East, is unlikely coincidental.

Historical Context: Great powers routinely discover that secondary conflicts drain resources needed for primary rivals. Britain's Boer War (1899-1902) consumed men and material while Germany accelerated naval construction. The US involvement in Vietnam diverted attention as the Soviet Union achieved strategic nuclear parity. In each case, the distracted power faced a more capable competitor upon conflict termination. The current US position may or may not echo these patterns. Much depends on how the administration gets to war termination. History suggests that competitors exploit such moments. China's South China Sea base construction resumption fits this pattern precisely.

Policy Takeaways: Washington should immediately prioritize munitions production surge authorities and consider redirecting a portion of Iran-bound Tomahawks to fulfill allied orders. Delay in Japanese strike capability directly undermines deterrence during the period of peak Taiwan risk. The Defense Production Act and allied co-production agreements offer available tools. The Hegseth-George episode warrants congressional attention. Frequent turnover of service chiefs during wartime creates continuity risk that adversaries can exploit. Establishing clearer norms around mid-term removals would signal institutional stability to allies. US Indo-Pacific Command should capitalize on accelerating Japan-ROK defense cooperation by proposing trilateral exercises that institutionalize interoperability gains. The refueling precedent creates an opening for deeper logistics integration that would prove critical in a Taiwan

Explainer LAMD (Long-Range Artillery Missile Defense): LAMD is South Korea's indigenous counter-artillery system, sometimes called the 'Korean Iron Dome,' though it differs in key respects. North Korea fields thousands of long-range artillery tubes and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) within range of Seoul, capable of delivering tens of thousands of rounds in the opening hours of a conflict. Unlike Israel's Iron Dome, which intercepts relatively slow rockets, LAMD must engage faster, longer-range threats including 240mm and 300mm MRL rounds. The system uses radar tracking and kinetic interceptors to destroy incoming projectiles before impact. Accelerating LAMD to 2029 acknowledges that North Korean artillery modernization, particularly the KN-25 600mm MRL, has outpaced previous timelines. For US forces, LAMD reduces the burden on Patriot batteries, freeing them for higher-tier ballistic missile threats.